

flying to Oregon this evening, or tomorrow morning, for a visit to that State. On the last five or six occasions on which he has visited the State of Washington, I have inquired of him, as politely as possible, as to his intentions with respect to the future of four dams on the Snake River. This inquiry is of significant importance to the people of the State of Washington, as well as the people of the State of Oregon. The answer from the Vice President is peculiarly important because of the disarray of the present administration. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has recommended that the dams come down, be removed, for salmon recovery. The Corps of Engineers, almost a year ago, was ready to recommend that the dams stay in place and that we deal with salmon recovery in another productive fashion. That recommendation was vetoed by the White House and removed physically from the Corps of Engineers' report.

More recently, the National Marine Fishery Service has said that we don't know enough to decide whether or not we should remove the dams and that the decision may be at least 5 or 10 years away. The Governor of Oregon has recommended that the dams come down. The Governor of Washington, also a Democrat, has opposed that recommendation. As you know, Mr. President, so have I, in the most vehement possible terms. Of all of the proposals for salmon recovery, dam removal is, first, the most ineffective and, second, of the most marginal utility with respect to the recovery of the salmon resource in the Pacific Northwest.

At a capital expenditure of \$1 billion to \$2 billion, and annual losses of at least a third of a billion dollars in perpetuity, the promise of salmon recovery from dam removal is extremely marginal, with no impact on some of the endangered runs, and only a modest improvement in the order of 10 to 20 percent in the prospects for certain other runs. Weighed against that are the potential real successes from the Salmon Recovery Board of the State of Washington, which has for the current year an appropriation from the Congress of \$18 million for the work of citizen-based salmon recovery teams, which will be the beneficiary of an appropriation from this body of about \$4 million.

There is a very real concern with predation at the mouth of the Columbia River—a concern now frustrated by a lawsuit against any removal of Caspian terns from an artificial island at the mouth of the river by at least a temporary injunction. These and dozens of other projects in the Pacific Northwest have a far greater promise for the salmon recovery than does dam removal, with all of its devastating impacts on the loss of benign, renewable energy power, to be substituted by the use of fossil fuels, for all of the loss of

agricultural land that requires irrigation to be anything other than a desert, for all the loss of a transportation system which is the most efficient and environmentally benign for the transportation of grain to ports on the lower Columbia River.

All of these factors argue against dam removal. But the Vice President of the United States, in his candidacy for President of the United States, refuses to make any commitment whatsoever on this matter. Now, it may be that he didn't want to respond to this Senator on these visits to the State of Washington. But he is now going to be asked to respond by the Governor of Oregon, who supports his candidacy. His response has been demanded by the Portland Oregonian, the largest newspaper in the State of Oregon, which, incidentally, holds my position and that of my colleague, Senator SMITH of Oregon, on the subject. One hopes that the Vice President will finally be able to come up with an opinion. Now, he has taken positions on other local issues. He is certainly quite willing to tell the people of South Carolina what flag they can fly. But he seems unwilling to tell the people of Washington and Oregon what his views are on an issue of vital importance to them and to their regional economy.

So I am here to express the hope that the Vice President will finally come clean with his views on this subject. But I must express the expectation that he will, once again, dodge the issue, pretend that he has not made up his mind when, in fact, he has, and claim that he can't make a substantive comment on this until after the election in November is over. I will regret that, Mr. President. His opponent, the Governor of Texas, has taken the forthright stand that it is improper and uneconomical and unwise to remove those dams. He will protect the physical infrastructure of the Pacific Northwest. I am here to invite the Vice President of the United States to do likewise, without, I regret to say, any expectation that he is willing to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GORTON). The Senator from Georgia.

DIALOG ON AMERICA'S GLOBAL ROLE III, MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I rise today, along with my distinguished colleague from Kansas, Senator ROBERTS, to continue our dialog on the global role of the United States. This is the third such dialog in what we have intended to be a year-long series. In February, we began by taking a broad look at the priorities and approaches of U.S. foreign policy in the post-cold-war period. A few weeks ago we narrowed the focus somewhat by trying to define and defend our national interest, which must be the first step in arriving at a coherent national security strategy.

Today, as we start to go from general principles to concrete applications, Senator ROBERTS and I, along with several of our colleagues, will attempt to zero in on the U.S. role in multilateral organizations which strongly impact our national security, especially NATO and the U.N.

I have just returned from a trip to Brussels and Italy where we were briefed on the air campaign from Aviano Air Base. In Brussels, I met with the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. As I said, Italy and then on to Macedonia, where we saw the regions where the refugees were kept during the war in Kosovo. Then, into Kosovo itself.

I met with key military leaders and key political leaders from the United States, European nations, and NATO. These meetings only served to reinforce my strong belief that there is a pressing need to address the global role of the United States, both in our own national strategic planning and in NATO's planning. This conclusion is not a result of the recent actions taken in Serbia and Kosovo. Rather, these actions were merely symptomatic of, I think, the problem.

A large portion of the military operation in Kosovo was supplied by the United States. I believe it is now time for the United States to lead in finding a political solution. Similarly, I believe the time has come to "Europeanize" the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. While the soldiers I spoke with at Camp Bond steel certainly displayed high morale, reflected in the excellent job they actually have done, if we stay in the Balkans indefinitely with no clear way out, I believe we run an increasing risk of further overextending our military, thus exacerbating our recruitment and retention problems and lessening our capability to respond to more serious challenges to our vital national interests.

From my perspective, the basic problem in the Balkans today is political, not military, and requires a political rather than military solution. Essentially, at this point in time, the various communities wish to live apart and exercise self-determination along ethnic lines. I would agree that such a development is unfortunate and not in keeping with our American view of the way the world should be. However, for any solution to the current situation to be acceptable to the parties directly involved—and, thus, durable—this inescapable fact must be taken into account.

On June 30 of last year, the Senate accepted by voice vote my amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill which expressed "the sense of the Senate that the United States should call immediately for the convening of an international conference on the Balkans" to develop a final political settlement of both the Kosovo and Bosnia conflicts.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of my amendment be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 1163 TO S. 1234, FISCAL YEAR 2000 FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS SUPPORTING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO ACHIEVE A DURABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE BALKANS

(Adopted by Senate by unanimous consent on 6/30/99)

SEC. X. SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE BALKANS.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted large-scale military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

(2) At the conclusion of 78 days of these hostilities, the United States and its NATO allies suspended military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia based upon credible assurances by the latter that it would fulfill the following conditions as laid down by the so called Group of Eight (G-8):

(A) An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.

(B) Staged withdrawal of all Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo.

(C) Deployment in Kosovo of effective international and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations Security Council, and capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the agreed objectives.

(D) Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, to be decided by the United Nations Security Council which will seek to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

(E) Provision for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo and an unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.

(3) These objectives appear to have been fulfilled, or to be in the process of being fulfilled, which has led the United States and its NATO allies to terminate military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

(4) The G-8 also called for a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region, and the European Union has announced plans for \$1,500,000,000 over the next 3 years for the reconstruction of Kosovo, for the convening in July of an international donors' conference for Kosovo aid, and for subsequent provision of reconstruction aid to the other countries in the region affected by the recent hostilities followed by reconstruction aid directed at the Balkans region as a whole;

(5) The United States and some of its NATO allies oppose the provision of any aid, other than limited humanitarian assistance, to Serbia until Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is out of office.

(6) The policy of providing reconstruction aid to Kosovo and other countries in the region affected by the recent hostilities while withholding such aid for Serbia presents a number of practical problems, including the absence in Kosovo of financial and other institutions independent of Yugoslavia, the difficulty in drawing clear and enforceable distinctions between humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and the difficulty in

reconstructing Montenegro in the absence of similar efforts in Serbia.

(7) In any case, the achievement of effective and durable economic reconstruction and revitalization in the countries of the Balkans is unlikely until a political settlement is reached as to the final status of Kosovo and Yugoslavia.

(8) The G-8 proposed a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking into full account the final Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, also known as the Rambouillet Accords, and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army).

(9) The G-8 proposal contains no guidance as to a final political settlement for Kosovo and Yugoslavia, while the original position of the United States and the other participants in the so-called Contact Group on this matter, as reflected in the Rambouillet Accords, called for the convening of an international conference, after three years, to determine a mechanism for a final settlement of Kosovo status based on the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

(10) The current position of the United States and its NATO allies as to the final status of Kosovo and Yugoslavia calls for an autonomous, multiethnic, democratic Kosovo which would remain as part of Serbia, and such an outcome is not supported by any of the Parties directly involved, including the governments of Yugoslavia and Serbia, representatives of the Kosovar Albanians, and the people of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo.

(11) There has been no final political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the armed forces of the United States, its NATO allies, and other non-Balkan nations have been enforcing an uneasy peace since 1996, at a cost to the United States alone of over \$10,000,000,000 with no clear end in sight to such enforcement.

(12) The trend throughout the Balkans since 1990 has been in the direction of ethnically-based particularism, as exemplified by the 1991 declarations of independence from Yugoslavia by Slovenia and Croatia, and the country in the Balkans which currently comes the closest to the goal of a democratic government which respects the human rights of its citizens is the nation of Slovenia, which was the first portion of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to secede and is also the nation in the region with the greatest ethnic homogeneity, with a population which is 91 percent Slovene.

(13) The boundaries of the various national and sub-national divisions in the Balkans have been altered repeatedly throughout history, and international conferences have frequently played the decisive role in fixing such boundaries in the modern era, including the Berlin Congress of 1878, the London Conference of 1913, and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

(14) The development of an effective exit strategy for the withdrawal from the Balkans of foreign military forces, including the armed forces of the United States, its NATO allies, Russia, and any other nation from outside the Balkans which has such forces in the Balkans is in the best interests of all such nations.

(15) The ultimate withdrawal of foreign military forces, accompanied by the establishment of durable and peaceful relations among all of the nations and peoples of the Balkans is in the best interests of those nations and peoples;

(16) An effective exit strategy for the withdrawal from the Balkans of foreign military forces is contingent upon the achievement of a lasting political settlement for the region, and only such a settlement, acceptable to all parties involved, can ensure the fundamental goals of the United States of peace, stability and human rights in the Balkans.

(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) The United States should call immediately for the convening of an international conference on the Balkans, under the auspices of the United Nations, and based upon the principles of the Rambouillet Accords for a final settlement of Kosovo status, namely that such a settlement should be based on the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of the agreement and the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act;

(2) The international conference on the Balkans should also be empowered to seek a final settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the same principles as specified for Kosovo in the Rambouillet Accords; and

(3) In order to produce a lasting political settlement in the Balkans acceptable to all parties, which can lead to the departure from the Balkans in timely fashion of all foreign military forces, including those of the United States, the international conference should have the authority to consider any and all of the following: political boundaries; humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for all nations in the Balkans; stationing of UN peacekeeping forces along international boundaries; security arrangements and guarantees for all of the nations of the Balkans; and tangible, enforceable and verifiable human rights guarantees for the individuals and peoples of the Balkans.

Mr. CLELAND. I truly believe that such an approach is the best, if not the only, way to resolve the difficulties in Bosnia and Kosovo—allowing our troops eventually to come home but avoiding an unacceptable security vacuum in southeast Europe—and is definitely in the best interest of the United States and Europe.

Two years ago this week, the Senate was debating the expansion of NATO, and I should add that I found that discussion to be perhaps the finest deliberation on national security issues that I have witnessed in the time I have served in the U.S. Senate. The debate raised serious questions regarding both the makeup and purpose of NATO, but, in the end, I, and a large majority of the Senate, concluded that extension of NATO membership to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary was in our, and NATO's, best interest because NATO was the only entity ready and able to fill the security void in north-eastern Europe.

Much has changed in the time since that vote, including the launching of the first offensive military operations in the history of the alliance last year in Kosovo and Serbia, an action which also represented the first time NATO

asserted the right to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. Both of these were significant departures from the Senate's understanding of NATO as expressed during that debate as well as the representations we made to other nations, most notably Russia, about the goals and the intentions of NATO in the aftermath its eastward expansion. Specifically, section 3 of the Senate Resolution of Ratification affirmed that the "core mission" of NATO remains "collective self-defense," and we sought to calm Russian anxieties by pointing to the 50-year record of NATO in never launching offensive operations, and never violating the sovereignty of states except in pursuit of collective self-defense.

Since we voted for NATO expansion we have also witnessed the issuance of a new Strategic Concept for NATO, in April of 1999, and here again, the results were not exactly as anticipated at the time of the Senate's ratification vote on NATO expansion 2 years ago. For a particularly insightful and detailed treatment of this subject, I would commend to all Senators a May 24, 1999 floor statement by my distinguished colleague from Kansas, Mr. ROBERTS, which dissected in some detail the numerous departures from the Senate's 1998 Resolution of Ratification in the April 1999 NATO Strategic Concept.

For purposes of today's discussion on how multilateral organizations impact on the U.S. global role, I would like to highlight just two of the issues identified by Senator ROBERTS: the central issue of NATO's purpose, or "core mission," and the matter of how European nations should provide for their own defense, the so-called European Security and Defense Identity.

For its first 50 years, which culminated in its victory in the Cold War without ever having to fight a battle, the core purpose of NATO, recognized by friend and foe alike, was set forth in article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty of April 4, 1949:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

In contrast, the new NATO Strategic Concept goes well beyond the traditional collective security role in its aspirations for NATO. Item 24 in the April 24, 1999 text states that:

Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Article 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must

also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.

I wonder if NATO is designed to track terrorism around the world, sabotage around the world, and organized crime around the world.

I continue to quote:

The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance.

Item 10 in that document includes as "fundamental security tasks" for NATO the traditional objectives of security, consultation, and deterrence and defense, as well as "crisis management," within which allies are "to stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity of Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations."

I wonder if NATO has become not a self-defense organization but a crisis management and crisis intervention organization. I wonder.

I point out that Article 7 of the NATO Treaty says that:

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

While some Western observers, especially in the United States, maintain that the 1999 Strategic Concept does not represent a significant change in NATO's policy, I believe that the Norwegian newspaper, *Oslo Aftenposten*, was much closer to the mark when it wrote last April that:

In its new "strategic concept" NATO has approved a radical expansion of the alliance's tasks, both geographically and with regard to content. From now on it will be the alliance's task to promote "security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area" by "becoming actively involved in dealing with crises, including operations in response to crises." We see the first example in Kosovo.

It is my view that the members of the NATO alliance, and especially the United States, need to think much more carefully about the expanded aspirations of their new strategic concept, and the costs—economic, political, and human resource—they are willing and able to pay in pursuit of these aspirations. Specifically, at the very least I believe both Houses of Congress, especially this House, the Senate, need to undertake a thorough series of hearings on the strategic concept and the future of NATO.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I could not urge this set of hearings more strongly.

The Norwegian paper goes on to say that:

It is also new and important that the alliance said "yes" at the summit meeting to the desire of the EU countries to play a more independent role and thus acquire greater political weight in the NATO cooperation. Behind this also lies a desire for a cautious counterweight to a United States that is perhaps more strongly dominant now, militarily and politically, than ever before in NATO's history.

Distinguished colleagues, this leads to my other major concern about the United States and NATO: the question of a "more independent role" for the European Union countries. John Keegan, one of the world's leading military historians, summed up the current debate in an article last December. He said:

Though it has long been American policy to encourage European political and economic integration on the model of its own federal structure, the United States is far less ready to welcome moves by the Europeans to go their own strategic way. There are two reasons for that. The first is that the United States sees its own security as inextricably bound up within the alliance system in which it is a partner. The second is that it doubts the ability of the Europeans to construct parallel systems which will deliver military value. . . . The Americans are right to regard all current European attempts, either through the European Union, or the belatedly revived Western European Union or through ad hoc arrangements such as the newly announced Anglo-French force, to bypass NATO as damaging to the security structure that already exists.

Despite its advances in economic integration, the European community still lags far behind in developing a common national security structure. As we witnessed in Bosnia, and most recently Kosovo, Europe lacks either the will or the means, or both, to conduct independent military operations even in its own backyard. And whatever the end result of the recent European Security and Defense Initiative, or Identity it will be many years before the Europeans can develop a military capable of significant action independent of the United States. When one adds the additional questions of national sovereignty, domestic pressures to cut defense spending, and, of course, the need for consensus on how and when to take military action, the challenges facing the Europeans are daunting indeed.

Until Europe can surmount these challenges, which, most likely, will be many years from now, American involvement and leadership via NATO will still be seen, by Europeans at least, as essential. On my recent trip, I was discussing the role of the United States in Europe with the Deputy Secretary of NATO, Sergio Balanzio, when he told me that the United States is, "a European power whether you like it or not—obviously, indicating we are a European power, whether we like it or not, in Europe and in the Balkans. I responded that it is one thing to be on the point of the spear and to bear the heavy load in certain cases, as the U.S.

did in Bosnia and Kosovo, but quite another to always be called upon to ride to the rescue, even in Europe itself.

Going back to 1949, when NATO was formed, one of the quotes that rings in my ears is a quote from Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO. When he was asked the purpose of NATO, Lord Ismay said: The purpose of NATO is to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.

I have serious reservations about that particular mission statement now. There is no need to keep the Russians out. As a matter of fact, we are wrapping our arms around the big bear in every way in every trade agreement, every cooperative agreement we can possibly put together. Secondly, there is no need to keep the Germans down. They are an emerging strong force on the European continent.

I wonder, though, having just come back from dealing with my NATO friends and our NATO allies, and having gone to Kosovo, whether the real ultimate purpose of NATO for the Europeans now is to keep the Americans in.

Personally, I do not mind sharing power. I do mind always being the lead dog that is called upon to bear the burden. I think more and more Americans are feeling that way themselves.

For me, however, the bottom line is that, despite all of the difficulties, despite the possibility that there may well be some short-term disadvantages for the United States, I believe the United States must, I repeat must, be unequivocally supportive of the development of a strong, independent European military capability to accompany Europe's growing economic and political integration. There is at present, and for the foreseeable future, no overwhelming threat to European security such as that posed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Europe should be able to attend to its own defenses in the post-Cold War world. The fact that it has not done so is certainly attributable to many factors, especially its divided and conflict-ridden history, but if it does not act now—when the threat is so low—then when will it?

Developing the necessary support structures, both political and military, to produce an effective European security identity will be neither quick, nor easy, nor cheap. But they have to start sometime, and while the United States must avoid precipitous actions—such as threatening a unilateral troop pull-out—I believe we must clearly signal that we fully understand and support moves toward greater European self-defense capabilities. Such moves may well produce some short-term redundancies and inefficiencies in NATO, but I believe that unless we encourage the Europeans to develop their own capabilities for their own defense, we will not see the kind of increased defense efforts that Europe ought to

undertake. Certainly American taxpayers have done their share, throughout most of the 20th Century, to contribute to European security.

I think British Prime Minister Tony Blair said it best in a November 22, 1999 speech in London. He said:

We must shape European Defence policy in a way designed to strengthen (the) transatlantic bond by making NATO a more balanced partnership, and by giving Europeans the capacity to act whenever the United States, for its own reasons, decides not to be involved. Only then will Europe pull its weight in world security and share more of the burden with the United States.

I could not have said it better.

Mr. President, I now yield the floor to the distinguished Senator from Kansas, my friend and colleague in these dialogs on the U.S. global role in the world, Mr. ROBERTS.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, let me again thank my good friend and a distinguished American hero and statesman, the Senator from Georgia, for setting in motion our bipartisan foreign policy dialog. His common sense approach and his insightfulness to our country's national security obligations, I think, have been most helpful and most educational.

I say to the Senator, I believe and I hope that our endeavor is accomplishing the original goals we outlined in our first dialog. Our dialog has attracted attention from the media, and some academics. We have been invited to participate in various academic panel discussions and foreign policy dialogs.

I hope both our colleagues and the American public have been paying attention in our effort to come to grips with America's role in an environment so different that we cannot even name it, other than calling it the post-Cold War period.

When I have the opportunity to go back to Kansas and address the issue of what our vital national security interests are; I realize foreign policy is not a very bright return on the public radar screen which is unfortunate.

Robert Kagan recently stated that the campaign for the Presidency should focus more on foreign policy. I certainly think that is the case. He asked a simple question, "Is the world a safer place than it was 8 years ago?" His article took us on a world tour of uncertainties, specifically identifying Iraq, the Balkans, China, Taiwan, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, Haiti, Colombia and Russia.

A realistic evaluation of emerging patterns in the world lead us to the fact that the world is dangerously close to coming apart at the seams. It is time for a serious debate about foreign policy, and this dialog we have started is a small step in that direction.

In our last dialog Senator CLELAND and I discussed the importance of iden-

tifying and establishing levels of priority to our U.S. vital national interests. Many other think tanks and foreign policy organizations have recommended a similar priority ranking. I noticed the other day in an article that Vice President GORE has recently articulated, a new kind of foreign policy suggestion—a new agenda—adding the destruction of the natural environment and the AIDS pandemic overseas as "a threat to U.S. national security interests." These unique and unprecedented issues are important issues, however, they have never made the cut in any other U.S. national interest lists. They definitely did not make the cut in the last bipartisan dialog that I had with my friend and colleague from Georgia. Nonetheless, it is a healthy debate, and I think it is a very proper debate for our country and the Presidential candidates.

What did make the cut is the fact that the United States does not want a hostile regional hegemon to develop in Europe or Asia. And then, in the meantime, what happened in the Balkans post-Bosnia and post-Kosovo is the fact that we have a paradox of enormous irony. The irony is the United States continues in the role of being a world hegemon, or superpower—the only one. Some critics say we have developed into a humanitarian world global cop and our actions and means are viewed by them as contrary to their own national interests.

Mr. President, the consequence of the U.S. role is the rest of the world is responding as any sovereign nation would respond to a hegemon.

Former Ambassador Bob Ellsworth, a former Member of the House of Representatives, and Dr. Michael May, wrote in the Los Angeles Times that U.S. military forces are so large, so advanced technologically, and so active all over the world, that a climate of "hegemony envy" has developed in key strategic areas in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

Ambassador Ellsworth explains, the U.S. post-Cold War, change in posture from defense and deterrence to enlargement and offense, and the Clinton doctrine proclaiming and executing intervention around the world in regard to a rather questionable definition of U.S. vital national interests is creating antihegemonic coalitions against the United States.

This current trend of both allies and nonallies asserting themselves against the U.S. is a very troubling digression.

The Nobel Prize novelist and diplomat, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, observed that "President Clinton has found the political legacy he wants to leave behind: The Imperial American Model." Obviously, that depiction of American foreign policy is counter to the goal of multilateral cooperation in the world today.

As Senator CLELAND stated, our third dialog today will focus on the role of

multilateral organizations in foreign policy.

What are we talking about? Well, currently the United States is a member of a staggering 90 multilateral organizations and numerous other bilateral agreements. It took a great deal of effort by staff and by research specialists to determine the number of multilateral organizations where the U.S. is obligated. I venture to guess, I say to my colleague, that the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Congress, and most foreign policy experts really don't have any idea individually or collectively of the responsibilities, commitments, or obligations or the money that these organizations require of the U.S. all throughout the world.

Richard Haass of the Brookings Institution tried to tackle the issue of how much the U.S. should try to do, largely or entirely on its own—unilaterally—depending on the policy priorities or the level of U.S. national interests versus how much the U.S. should do in cooperation with others. He articulated that the choice is very complicated, as the multilateral options subsume multiple approaches of multiple organizations, including using the U.N. and other international institutions, alliances, and other regional organizations, and coalitions of those able and willing to act.

The fact is, the U.S. almost never acts unilaterally, and it probably should not. The U.S. has fought five major wars during the 20th century, and in each of these conflicts the U.S. operated as part of an alliance or a coalition. The recent U.S. actions all were conducted in conjunction with forces from other nations, even as our military superiority has reached a level unmatched in history.

Therefore, if the U.S. is going to operate within the constraints of multilateral organizations—and that appears to be the case—the U.S. must structure alliances in such a way that promotes our national interests and ensures that U.S. power is not undermined.

The following list of multilateral organizations associated with countries that the U.S. has current, ongoing operations is staggering: Iraq, 23; East Timor, 5; Korea, 42; Kosovo, 6; Yugoslavia, 30; Colombia, 15.

We don't have enough time in the rest of the session of Congress to examine all of the multilateral organizations where the U.S. has obligations. Obviously, that is going to be an effort that should take place as we change administrations, whether it be the Vice President or whether it be the Governor from Texas. Today, like my colleague, I want to focus on NATO a bit and offer some possible suggestions for the future of America's alliances.

During the Cold War, containment of Soviet power provided a simple and easily definable job of deterrence from

Warsaw Pact aggression. The new Strategic Concept that was adopted over a year ago during the 50th anniversary of NATO is a far different concept from the collective defense organization originally developed from the ashes of World War II.

If you read the Strategic Concept, you will find that the new commitments outlined have evolved, as I have indicated, NATO from a collective security organization concerned with self-defense to an international crisis management and humanitarian relief operation and organization.

Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, recently said:

Unbeknownst to many is the fact that the Strategic Concept's most important function is to instruct Alliance military authorities how to configure NATO defense forces so that they are equipped for the full range of Alliance missions, from collective defense to peacekeeping.

He also said:

The U.S. believes that the most important new elements of the revised Strategic Concept is the recognition that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance is to carry out so-called "non-article 5" missions—operations in response to crises that go beyond the defense of a Allied territory.

I am concerned that the most important and successful alliance in the history of our country has been so dramatically restructured that the future of the alliance is uncertain. Our force structure cannot stand another swampy intervention with unclear and unsound objectives with no exit strategy in sight.

The new Strategic Concept, as tested in Kosovo, in my personal opinion, is drying out the Cold War glue which holds the alliance together. Targeting by committee and escalation warfare has stressed the system and turned a 3-day war into a 78-day war of limited escalation. As indicated by the debate on this floor just about an hour or two ago, an amendment introduced by both Senator BYRD and Senator WARNER will cause considerable and useful debate on Monday and Tuesday ending in a critical vote about the future of the Kosovo operation.

Gen. Brent Scowcroft expressed his concern last November stating:

The revised Strategic Concept of NATO and the U.N. Secretary General separately have taken on the task of advocating the support of persecuted minorities inside state boundaries; that is, humanitarian operations such as those in Kosovo. In Yugoslavia, we heavily bombed a country in an attempt to protect a minority within that country. Now we are in Kosovo presiding over reverse ethnic cleansing—surely a case of unintended consequences.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Dean of the Kennedy School of Government, recently posed several thought-provoking questions:

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, what should be the limits of NATO's mission? With the Kosovo crisis, NATO fired its

first shot in anger in a region outside the alliance's treaty area, on declared humanitarian grounds. What criteria might NATO draw on to guide a policy on the threat, or use, of its force in a new strategic environment of the 21st century?

Some experts predict, and I hope they are not right, that due to the ugliness of Kosovo, NATO may never again mount another military offensive. I fear that Kosovo or future Kosovo-type interventions will also undermine U.N. Security Council credibility. By the way, that credibility is being questioned with the U.N. mission in Africa.

Mr. President, if knowing what we know now about the new Strategic Concept and NATO with respect to a Kosovo or a Chechnya or Rwanda, would Senators still support the changes?

Again, I maintain that most Senators are not aware of all the obligations listed in the Strategic Concept. I said it at the time, I said it 6 months ago, I said it during the first dialog, and I say it again today. How many people need to be placed in jeopardy before we act? What criteria do we set for humanitarian or C-list interventions? Does the United States intervene with or without NATO allies or U.N. Security Council approval on humanitarian grounds? Can we possibly justify intervention in some areas of the world and not others when none reach the threshold of vital or important national interests?

Our country cannot support militarily a future which pursues U.S. and allied interests more widely around the world. The new Strategic Concept that our country is currently operating under effectively enrolls the United States and NATO as a world policeman.

Some say that is not all bad. Some say that is what we must do as the world's only superpower.

In this regard, as the distinguished Senator from Georgia pointed out, Europe is not standing still. They are proceeding with a Defense Capability Initiative and the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the alliance.

I believe it is in U.S. interests for the European alliance to develop their defense capabilities, to strengthen their collective will, and to make a greater contribution to security and defense in Europe. However, my Dodge City gut feeling says, sure, go ahead and provide for your own defense, and bring our American men and women home. The Balkans are in your ball park. You decide the players.

However, history and military experience, and the experience and expertise of others, rightly point out that challenges with force structure, allocation, balance, interoperability, and the growing gap in tactics and capability between our countries underlying the auspices of NATO are counterproductive to peace.

In Kosovo, the U.S. aircraft flew two-thirds of the strike missions. Nearly

every precision-guided munition was launched from an American aircraft, and U.S. intelligence identified almost all the targets. With the current European shrinking defense budgets and a reluctance to support the current mission, the road to ESDI may be a rocky one filled with potholes indeed.

Even members of NATO who do not belong to the European Union are worried that plans for yet another new E.U. military force could weaken the collective defense.

Another concern of hierarchy and command structure with respect to ESDI, E.U. corps, and NATO still retaining the rights of first refusal and how the U.N. Security Council structure fits among the organizations is also a very troubling problem to overcome.

The number one concern should be to preserve NATO as the overarching framework and avoid duplication of effort or any political divisiveness from establishing separate capabilities. The Kosovo crisis raises questions that must be answered about the alliance's capability to reshape itself for new conflicts of the 21st century and at the same time accommodate the E.U.'s ambition to play a greater role in the continent's security.

Mr. President, I also want to address the issue of NATO expansion.

I realize the NATO membership is an affair of the heart for many nations who aspire to become members. However, as Senator LUGAR has alluded to we need to step back a little bit and keep the door open but put the future enlargement on hold.

We had a lunch hosted yesterday by the distinguished Senator from Indiana and Gen. Wesley Clark. Gen. Clark emphasized the fact that nations in Europe who aspire to become either members of the European Union, Partnership for Peace, or NATO without recognizing the tremendous fervor and the tremendous emotion involved in regard to their self-determination and what they think will be the bulwark for them and their individual liberty.

First and foremost, NATO, I think, must rebuild Russian relations, which were strained over the Kosovo conflict. I know that belief is shared by Senator LEVIN. We have been working together on a cooperative threat reduction program within the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee which we believe will make some meaningful threat reduction progress and at the same time help rebuild stressed relations.

The London Times diplomatic editor, Christopher Lockwood, reflects that NATO's possible new members at the current time cannot contribute militarily with force structure, compatible doctrine, or political and economic stability.

I have been a strong supporter of NATO. I will remain a strong supporter

of NATO. But I think we have to rethink the current NATO flightpath and answer the hard questions that require our attention.

Mr. President, I now want to offer what I think are extremely insightful approaches to the future of multilateral organizations.

Richard Haass expressed:

Alliances, such as NATO, are one manifestation, although such groupings are rare and likely to become even less common in a world of few fixed adversaries. Much more common are informal coalitions of parties able and willing to work together on behalf of a common purpose—be it to rescue the Mexican economy, contain Saddam Hussein, or enter East Timor. Such groupings are not ideal—they are invariably ad hoc and reactive and lack the legitimacy of more formal regional or UN undertakings—but they are consistent with a world where the willingness of governments to cooperate varies from crisis to crisis and situation to situation, where great power consensus is unreliable, and where U.S. resources, however great, are still limited.

Samuel Huntington, in this book "The Clash of Civilizations" explain: "In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against war." And, since the Cold War the question of "Which side are you on?" has been replaced by the much more fundamental one, "Who are you?" Every state has to have an answer. That answer, its cultural identity, defines the state's place in world politics, its friends, and its enemies.

Mr. Huntington further explains that we must nurture other Western cultures that identify with the U.S. and accept our civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi civilizational character of global politics.

Roberts translation: Why not concentrate in areas of the world where Western values, Western democracy, have been cherished, nurtured, and appreciated? At the same time the U.S. needs to stop trying to impose Western values in areas where they are not and will not take root?

Andrew Krepinevich from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently finished a thought-provoking future vision titled "Transforming America's Alliances." He believes that America's alliances are in need of transformation due to the following reasons: Relative decline in U.S. global power, the rise and recovery of great regional power, with an increased focus on Asia, the eroding of current ally durability and reliability, the current military revolution will make power projection more difficult, and finally the growing need to provide for homeland defense.

Mr. President, I feel Mr. Krepinevich's assessment undertakes

bold steps toward the future in his following statement:

If the U.S. is to preserve the current favorable military balance in regions around the globe in the future, it will find itself increasingly dependent upon allies for support. This may require a somewhat different set of alliances than exist today. Restructuring alliance relationships to meet requirements will take years, perhaps decades. Yet the geopolitical and military revolutions that will likely stress the U.S. alliance relationships should be undertaken now.

Mr. President, that is what we are trying to do. That is what Senator CLELAND and I are trying to accomplish with our foreign policy dialog. America cannot afford to miss this opportunity to shape the future.

I thank my colleague for initiating the third dialog. I especially thank my colleagues who have been very patient listening to my remarks. Senator LUGAR, Senator LEVIN, and I welcome their input.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of Oregon). The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Indiana yield for 2 minutes?

Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent, after the Senator from Indiana is finished with his remarks, I be recognized to participate in the dialog which is going on between Senator ROBERTS and Senator CLELAND.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia controls the time.

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 9½ minutes.

Mr. CLELAND. I yield the time necessary to the distinguished Senator from Michigan.

Mr. ROBERTS. I ask the Presiding Officer how much time I have remaining.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators from Kansas and Georgia are sharing the time.

Mr. ROBERTS. So the time remaining in regard to both Senators is now 9 minutes?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. ROBERTS. That does not give enough time for the distinguished Senator from Michigan or the distinguished Senator from Indiana. I ask unanimous consent we be granted an additional 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent, after the Senator from Indiana has completed his statement, I be recognized with whatever time is available.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, at this time I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from me

along with one I received today from Gen. Wesley Clark, who, until last week, was NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and the senior military commander of the NATO-led operation at Kosovo. It relates to his views on the Byrd-Warner amendment, as it is called, which is part of the military construction appropriations bill.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Washington, DC, May 10, 2000.

General WESLEY K. CLARK, USA,

Department of Defense, Washington, DC.

DEAR GENERAL CLARK: Following up on our conversation today, I am enclosing a copy of an amendment adopted by the Appropriations Committee yesterday that, among other things, would terminate funding for deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless the President requests and Congress enacts a joint resolution specifically authorizing their continued deployment.

I would very much like to have your personal views on this amendment, particularly your views on the impact this amendment could have on U.S. troops currently on the ground in Kosovo and whether or not this amendment would increase the risk to those troops; the impact of this amendment on U.S. interests in the region; and the impact of this amendment on our relationship with our NATO allies.

Thank you for your consideration of this important matter.

Sincerely,

CARL LEVIN,
Ranking Minority Member.

MAY 11, 2000.

DEAR SENATOR LEVIN: Thank you for your letter of 10 May and the opportunity to provide my personal views on the amendment adopted by the Senate Appropriations Committee governing the future of U.S. troops in Kosovo.

While I support efforts of the Congress and the Administration to encourage our allies to fulfill their commitments to the United Nations mission in Kosovo, I am opposed to the specific measures called for in the amendment. These measures, if adopted, would be seen as a de facto pull-out decision by the United States. They are unlikely to encourage European allies to do more. In fact, these measures would invalidate the policies, commitments and trust of our Allies in NATO, undercut US leadership worldwide, and encourage renewed ethnic tension, fighting and instability in the Balkans. Furthermore, they would, if enacted, invalidate the dedication and commitment of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, disregarding the sacrifices they and their families have made to help bring peace to the Balkans.

Regional stability and peace in the Balkans are very important interests of the United States. Our allies are already providing over 85 percent of the military forces and the funding for reconstruction efforts. US leadership in Kosovo exercised through the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, as well as our diplomatic offices, is a bargain. It is an effective 6:1 ratio of diplomatic throw-weight to our investment. We cannot do significantly less. Our allies would see this as a unilateral, adverse move that splits fifty years of shared burdens, shared risks, and shared benefits in NATO.

This action will also undermine specific plans and commitments made within the Alliance. At the time that US military and diplomatic personnel are pressing other nations to fulfill and expand their commitment of forces, capabilities and resources, an apparent congressionally mandated pullout would undercut their leadership and all parallel diplomatic efforts.

All over Europe, nations are looking to the United States. We are their inspiration, their model, and their hope for the future. Small nations, weary of oppression, ravaged by a century of war, looking to the future, look to us. The promise of NATO enlargement, led by the United States, is the promise of the expansion of the sphere of peace and stability from Western Europe eastward. This powerful, stabilizing force would be undercut by this legislation, which would be perceived to significantly curtail US commitment and influence in Europe.

Setting a specific deadline for US pull-out would signal to the Albanians the limits of the international security guarantees providing for their protection. This, in turn, would give them cause to rearm and prepare to protect themselves from what they would view as an inevitable Serbian reentry. The more radical elements of the Albanian population in Kosovo would be encouraged to increase the level of violence directed against the Serb minority, thereby increasing instability as well as placing US forces on the ground at increased risk. Mr. Milosevic, in anticipation of the pullout and ultimate breakup of KFOR, would likely encourage civil disturbances and authorize the increased infiltration of para-military forces to raise the level of violence. He would also take other actions aimed at preparing the way for Serbian military and police reoccupation of the province.

Our servicemen and women, and their families, have made great sacrifices in bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. This amendment introduces uncertainty in the planning and funding of the Kosovo mission. This uncertainty will be undermine our service members' confidence in our resolve and may call into question the sacrifices we have asked of them and their families. A US withdrawal could give Mr. Milosevic the victory he could not achieve on the battlefield.

In all of our activities in NATO, the appropriate distribution of burdens and risk remains a longstanding and legitimate issue among the nations. Increased European burden sharing is an imperative in Europe as well as the United States. European nations are endeavoring to meet this challenge in Kosovo, and in the whole KFOR and UNMIK constitute a burdensharing success story, even as we encourage Europeans to do even more. The United States must continue to act in our own best interests. This legislation, if enacted, would see its worthy intent generating consequences adverse to some of our most fundamental security interests.

Thank you again for your support of our servicemen and women.

Very respectfully,

WESLEY K. CLARK,
General, U.S. Army.

Mr. LEVIN. I will take 30 seconds to read two paragraphs about the language in the letter from Wesley Clark:

These measures, if adopted, would be seen as a de facto pull-out decision by the United States. They are unlikely to encourage European allies to do more. In fact, these measures would invalidate the policies, commitments and trust of our Allies in NATO, undercut U.S. leadership worldwide, and en-

courage renewed ethnic tension, fighting and instability in the Balkans. Furthermore, they would, if enacted, invalidate the dedication and commitment of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, disregarding the sacrifices they and their families have made to help bring peace to the Balkans.

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Mr. Milosevic, in anticipation of the pullout and ultimate breakup of KFOR, would likely encourage civil disturbances and authorize the increased infiltration of para-military forces to raise the level of violence. He would also take other actions aimed at preparing the way for Serbian military police reoccupation of the province.

I know this subject will be a matter of some debate on Monday and Tuesday. I intend to participate in that debate on the appropriations bill containing the Byrd-Warner provision. But at this time, because of the interest in the letter of General Clark, I thought I would ask that be printed in the RECORD.

Again, I thank my friend from Indiana for yielding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senators from Georgia and Kansas. It is a privilege to follow on some of the thoughts of the distinguished Senator from Kansas, as he has discussed multilateral organizations and focused especially on NATO which, in the judgment of many of us, is the most important and successful of these organizations in which the United States is a member.

It is axiomatic, at least for many in foreign policy, that Europe counts for the United States. By that I mean simply this: that although throughout our history many have argued that we could get along by ourselves on this continent and that entanglement in the affairs of Europe was often described as nefarious skullduggery statesmanship without scruple, that eventually we come back to the fact that in the small world in which we live now, what happens on that continent matters a great deal to our security and to our prosperity.

It is for this reason that the United States stayed in Europe after World War II. To state it very simply, as German Foreign Minister Fischer stated when he visited with our Foreign Relations Committee this week: The United States presence, the decision to stay, made all the difference in the last half century. It made a difference in terms

of peace on the Europe continent, which had not had such an era of peace in a whole millennium.

It made a very great difference for us, the United States, leaving aside NATO and the security it provided, because of the collective defense of NATO members against the perceived menace of the former Soviet Union and its allies. The fact is that through the Marshall Plan, and through many other economic associations, the European countries grew substantially and so did our markets and so did our prosperity. We tend to take this all for granted, but only in the last 50 years has this been a fact.

We came to a point after the breakup of the former Soviet Union in which many argued, and I was not the one who originated the term, but I adopted it in a tour I took of Europe in 1993, that either NATO would go "out of area or out of business." By that I meant simply that the idea of collective defense against the former Soviet Union, which had broken up, made much less sense than it had made before. Some would have said the Soviet Union might revive suddenly and attack hapless European nations, but this became less and less likely. In fact, we found in the Desert Storm war, that our problem was that NATO was not equipped to deal with conflicts out of area. It was a pickup game in which we enlisted various nations.

This out of area action had been contemplated at the time of the United Nations Charter in Article 4, which Senator ROBERTS has cited. John Foster Dulles spoke openly and eloquently on that point. It was anticipated that NATO members from time to time would act out of area in their collective efforts and for collective security. So we did that in Desert Storm and the idea was always, from the time of the United Nations Charter and the NATO Charter onward, that nations could freely decide to join in such actions. In the case of Desert Storm they did so.

Now that a whole new set of facts began to come forward, in which there were countries—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and others—but mainly the first three—in which the point was made: We are a democracy. We are searching for freedom. We are searching for relevance and association with others who want freedom as we do.

Some argued the evolution of Europe might have come entirely through the European Union, through the economic union of the members. But most of us noted that was going very slowly. It still goes slowly. Poland is not a member of the European Union as we speak, and it is not contemplated that it will be for several years. This is now a very large country with a functioning economy and a democracy.

The point was that collective security meant making certain that the gains, the victories of the cold war,

were ensured and were solidified. That was the debate that we had a short time ago with regard to expansion of NATO. Some argued: Why expand if there is no particular threat? Why not wait and see how the threat shapes up? You can always take on new members in the event things are troubled.

But many argued, and I was one, that the integration of forces, the building of institutions, takes time. Even in the successful war we fought in the desert, the weapons systems that were employed took 25 years to evolve. It is very probable that the strengths we are now building with new members in Europe, in NATO, will make a difference in terms of their collective security, and I believe in ours. With the crisis over, many persons in the United States and maybe in this body, tend to ask: Why are we involved in Europe? In fact, why can't Europeans run their own affairs? They say it is a troublesome situation to have our forces involved there, meddling and in harm's way.

We went through this in a very practical way with regard to the war in Bosnia. As you may recall, in the latter stages of the Bush administration, there was anxiety on the part of President Bush as to what was happening in the former Yugoslavia. He was strongly advised by European leaders that they knew better what was happening there, that our involvement was really not particularly welcomed. President Bush may have welcomed that advice, for all I know. But in any event, his determination was to leave that problem alone, so the conflict continued to progress badly in terms of the loss of life and displacement of persons and refugees and so forth.

President Clinton attacked former President Bush in the 1992 campaign for failing to have a plan for Bosnia. But when President Clinton came into office in 1993 he found out how difficult that situation was.

I know from my own experience, traveling with Senator Nunn in 1993, talking on the phone with President Clinton over long distance as he asked what we were finding out and how things were going? He was attempting to evolve a policy.

He sent Secretary Christopher to Europe about that time, a trip which was very unsuccessful. The Secretary talked with the British and then the French and gave our views and asked their views. They had all sorts of views, all of them contradictory, and none of them helpful with regard to anything we had in mind.

As a result, things drifted. Some may say that was simply too bad. Here are people with intractable views, demagogues. Whatever was happening in Yugoslavia was miserable and unfortunate for those people, and especially for their neighbors, our European allies. But that was their problem—and

perhaps it was. But late in the game, Europeans came to us and said: We cannot solve it. It is insoluble without the United States.

We might have said, "Tough luck. You are on your own. This is what you wanted. You made your bed, now sleep in it."

We could have said that. We could have watched the unraveling of various parts of Europe as refugees and economic difficulties and aggression proceeded. But we took a different view—I think the correct view—namely, we are the leaders in NATO. NATO was relevant to that situation.

That was a big step but not all Senators agreed. The point being made in the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia and the distinguished Senator from Virginia is that we have not gone to war very often. We have declared war even less. It is time to stop these informal arrangements in which we get involved in operations without having an up-or-down vote or authorization to spend money or send the troops.

That is a good point. I can remember arguing before the Desert Storm war that we ought to do that, and there was great anxiety in the White House about any such vote for fear it might come out badly that Saddam Hussein, therefore, would have a free ride. Ultimately, the vote was very close.

I understand the constitutional point very well. It could very well be that historians will argue we misplayed our hand at Rambouillet, that our diplomacy was not as swift as it should have been, that we made threats when we did not understand the military power that would be necessary to make those threats good, and that even having made the threats, we did not have a very good plan once we were tested. I make no apologies for any of what proceeded, but the point is, we finally come back to the fact we are in Europe because it is our security—our security—that is at stake. It could be argued, too, that for the moment the Europeans are not sharing the burden, although they would argue, by this time, that they are shouldering their burden—but that is another debate all by itself. Or they might argue we should not be involved without having up-or-down votes in the Congress on these things in any event, or that many Americans believe we are in Kosovo or in Bosnia purely for humanitarian purposes, not for gut strategic purposes of the United States, but because of ethnic cleansing or refugees or displaced persons.

The case will be made that this is not a real war, this is a policing action; it is a structural problem, like that faced by a mayor of a city or police or other situations analogous that can be handled by police, and European policemen rather than American policemen.

We keep coming back to this haunting question that President George

Bush had to face and then President Bill Clinton when the Europeans said: We cannot make it by ourselves. Ultimately, Europeans might say: We can; we are different now; we have new institutions—whether they be security or economic—and you Americans can go home; we can get along without you; it's been nice to have you around.

That is not what they are saying. As a matter of fact, every European statesman who comes to Washington—and the Chair presides over these coffees in our Foreign Relations Committee—we hear every single foreign minister and defense minister vowing how important it is the United States is there, stays there, stays there big, how we must take the lead and help organize the situation. We may say in our impatience: Will they never be able to pull it together? Perhaps not in our lifetime.

What are the consequences if we leave? The consequence is the same one the German foreign minister told us this week. We left after the First World War. As a matter of fact, throughout the 1930s, we were not only isolationists, we were glad we were not close to the action, and we suffered for that. We lost a lot of lives. We had a war around the world that was touch and go for some time because we were not prepared to do the difficult work, the tedious work, the actual intervention day by day, the grimy, grubby work of diplomacy country by country, case by case. That is the problem.

Duty in Kosovo, duty in Bosnia is not a popular assignment for anybody and never will be. I can think of various other places in Europe in which it is not going to be very pleasant. Yet to keep the peace for over 50 years, to have prosperity for them and for us, to make a difference in terms of stability of the world, that counts for something.

On the cheap, we can say, by and large, we did not vote for it, we are tired of paying too much for it. Europeans understand that a little bit, and I give credit to the distinguished Senator from Virginia for trying to urge them to step up to the plate, and they have now demonstrated they are paying more than 85 percent—the lion's share—whether it is the policing side or the economic side, and that we are paying 15 percent, and that is about what we agreed to do.

They said, in essence: You fought most of the war, we will pick up five-sixths of the cost. That may or may not be a good agreement, but that is roughly where we have come to in Kosovo. We could say we are tired of paying the 15 percent and, as a matter of fact, our 5,000 or 6,000 troops are tired of being there and, as a Senate, we are tired of debating the issue. We would just like to get a vote on this and get rid of it cleanly. Tell the President, whoever he is, where to go in this

situation. It makes no difference whether we have a Secretary of State negotiating over there or not, we know better because we represent the people and we have the power of the purse and we can jerk this thing out immediately.

Some will argue whether or not to do that as a matter of fact. The vote would not come for a year. General Clark has testified to this in the letter the distinguished Senator from Michigan just read, that other countries will make their own calculations. We, frankly, do not know what the foreign policy of President Putin of Russia will be. We suspect, as a matter of fact, as we have heard from the Russian Ambassador and from others that the Russians want a zone in Kosovo, maybe ours. Let's say we withdraw and the Russians say: It would be fine, as a matter of fact, if we were there because we could help integrate the Serbs as they want to come back to their homes, or help with a little bridge there; that would be a good thing in terms of integration of Europe as we see it; and we are here as Russians; the Americans have gone home; they were tired of this, tired of the policing action and all the burdens, all the difficulties. That is one possibility.

President Milosevic might say: Let's be at ease for a year, wait it out. Kosovo was sort of a contretemps, a bad nightmare. A good many bombs were dropped around the country, there was some difficulties with the power stations and difficulties in terms of deprivation, but, by and large, that is in the past, and in a year's time, we can be home free. We can begin to operate business as usual.

The Albanians noting the situation likewise say: We have a year to prepare for the war to take on the Serbs who are back with perhaps the help of Russian friends and others who come in to fill this vacuum.

European allies will be accused frequently of withdrawing people from the country. They will say, by and large, the Americans are a strange leader; they are gone. This is the only war NATO ever fought and some may feel the only one it ever will fight because there was not very much leadership here, not much standing to talk to us about whether we have an independent force, whether it is with NATO or anybody else.

We have a very fateful vote coming up, and it comes right to the point we are discussing today: multinational organizations and particularly NATO, the most important security alliance, because Europe counts.

I suggest we do reaffirm NATO.

As a matter of fact, as the distinguished Senator from Kansas pointed out, I suggested last year at the NATO celebration that we consider carefully new members. There were nine applicants. I say it is imperative that we

keep hope alive for all nine. That is the incentive for their reform and for the courage to continue on.

As a matter of fact, I hope we will move to adopt new members. I hope we will offer leadership to fill out much more substantially those who have fought for freedom, those who have a lot at stake in the kind of Europe we think would be more secure for them and for us.

I think we ought to be devoting more resources to NATO rather than less. It seems to me we have a golden opportunity. Historically, we have been established there for a long time. To abandon or weaken NATO at this point, or to give hints we are going to abandon it, or to give hints that it can be taken for granted, would be an unfortunate policy.

By the same token, this debate gives us an opportunity to finally establish, once and for all the question: Does Europe count? Do we care? Can Europe make it without us? I believe it counts. I do not think they can make it without us. I think we have to be there. And if we are going to be there, we ought to lead, and we ought to have the resources that make it count. We ought to expand the operation, as a matter of fact. We ought to be assertive and bold as opposed to timidly pulling back into our tent.

I believe that is what the debate ought to be about. It ought to be about the strength of the very best multinational organization we have, about the reasons our allies are important to us, and what we intend to do about it.

I thank the Chair for the opportunity to give this address.

I thank the distinguished Senators from Georgia and Kansas, again, for inviting me to be a part of the colloquy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. CLELAND. How much time is left on our time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 minutes remaining.

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I would like to conclude my remarks with some additional thoughts and comments.

I thank Senator LUGAR, a distinguished student and practitioner of foreign policy in this body for many years, and the distinguished Senator from Michigan, Mr. LEVIN, and thank him for his wonderful letter from General Clark, who is a man with whom I have shared a meal recently and discussed Kosovo and many other matters. He is a distinguished American. I respect him highly.

I thank my distinguished colleague from Kansas. One of the things that impressed me was the point the Senator from Kansas mentioned, that this country is committed and obligated in some form or fashion to 90 different treaties or organizations, and that is indeed quite an astounding number.

I have two basic fears about America's global role. One is that, like Gulliver, we will get wrapped up in many lilliputian events and treaties and entanglements and not be free to move to crises in the world where we need to have a maximum impact; secondly, that we get drawn into power vacuums around the world, particularly in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, and institute a *pax Americana*.

I was recently in Macedonia. As the helicopter took off, headed toward Kosovo, an Army colonel pointed out that if you looked out of the helicopter to your left, you could see a Roman aqueduct. I had never really been in that part of the world. It was amazing to actually see a Roman aqueduct put together by the Roman armies there in Macedonia over 2,000 years ago and it still be intact.

I began to think the very ground over which I was flying had been occupied by not only Alexander the Great but his father Philip, and that Greek and Roman armies had gone over this very terrain. Later, after the Dark Ages, for some 600 years the Turks and the Ottoman Empire occupied this particular land. Now we, the Americans, were there.

It was a sobering moment for me. I wondered exactly how effective we could really be in that part of the world with those conflicts which seem to be eternal. I wondered exactly what we could do there, what we could contribute, especially with our military force.

Those are some thoughts I have.

I would like to address one other issue in terms of our multilateral and multinational relations, and that is our relationship with the United Nations.

In large part because of American support, the UN was founded in 1945 with the purpose, according to its Charter:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

Furthermore, under Article 34 of the U.N. Charter, U.N. "members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." And Article 52 provides that:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrange-

ments or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

In recent years, the United States has worked with, and sometimes without, the cooperation of the U.N. Security Council when seeking to accomplish its objectives. Despite all the difficulties associated with it, the Security Council remains the only widely accepted, multinational, legitimizing force for conducting military operations against a sovereign nation. In the 1995 book, "Beyond Westphalia," editors Gene Lyons, Michael Mustanduno and their colleagues tackled the difficult question of "state sovereignty and international intervention." The authors write that:

A historical transition was marked by the settlement of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and opened the quest—which goes on to this day—to find a way for independent states, each enjoying sovereignty over a given territory, to pursue their interests without destroying each other or the international system of which each is a part.

One of the recurring themes which has been highlighted in these floor dialogues organized by Senator ROBERTS and myself about the global role of the United States in the post-Cold War world is on this very question of sovereignty. More specifically, under what conditions is it permissible and appropriate for a nation or coalition of nations to intervene in the internal affairs of another sovereign state?

In an April 1999 speech in Chicago, British Prime Minister Blair posed the question in a way which is representative of the concerns of many of those—especially in the Western democracies—who believe that, under certain egregious circumstances, there must be limits on national sovereignty in today's world. Prime Minister Blair said:

The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other people's conflicts. Non-interference has long been considered an important principle of international order. And it is not one we would want to jettison too readily. One state should not feel it has the right to change the political system of another or foment subversion or seize pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some claim. But the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighboring countries then they can properly be described as "threats to international peace and security."

It is interesting that on that same day in 1999, Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso offered some related observations, with his views on the Kosovo War, which he and his country supported. President Cardoso's views reflect the concerns of many of those in the developing world who worry about the consequences of a loss of sovereignty in reducing their ability to control their own destiny.

We heard Senator ROBERTS talk about the fear of the United States and its growing hegemony or being a great hegemony in various portions of the world, or being the "big dog."

President Cardoso said this:

Who has the authority and approval of the international community to drop bombs? Such attacks are not endorsed by an international organization that legalized such actions. The United Nations was left aside . . . The United States currently constitutes the only large center of political, economic, technologic, and even cultural power. This country has everything to exert its domain on the rest of the world, but it must share it. There must be rules, even for the stronger ones. When the strongest one makes decisions without listening, everything becomes a bit more difficult. In this European war, NATO made the decision, but who legalized it? That is the main problem. I am convinced more than ever that we need a new political order in the world.

How do we reconcile these different and sometimes conflicting, yet both legitimate, concerns: the need on the one hand to protect powerless individuals from the depredations of their own governments, and on the other to protect less powerful nations from unilateral or even multilateral decisions by the stronger powers?

Mr. President, in the last dialog, I tried to quote President Kennedy. I think I got the quote wrong. I think he said that "we must dream of a world in which the strong are just, the weak secure, and the peace preserved." I think that is what President Cardoso was after.

The editors of *Beyond Westphalia* draw four principal conclusions which bear on this matter. The first two offer encouragement to those who see a clear need for constraints on unfettered sovereignty, especially in cases of massive human rights violations:

First, constraints on state sovereignty not only have a long history but have been increasing significantly in recent years as a consequence of both growing interdependence and the end of the cold war . . . (Second), while constraints on state sovereignty traditionally were largely constraints on states' behavior with regard to other states, in recent decades constraints on sovereignty have increasingly involved the internal affairs of states, or how governments relate to their own citizens, economies, and territories.

However, the current limits on international interventions are captured in the final two observations:

(Third), the international community has developed a formidable institutional presence, yet clearly lacks the resources and organizational capacity to serve as a viable alternative to the society of sovereign states . . . (Fourth), the legitimacy of the international community will continue to be questionable as long as there are fundamental differences between North and South with regard to whose values and interests the international community represents . . . If the major powers claim to be acting, through the exercise of their international decisionmaking authority, as the guardians of the common good, less powerful states

seem to want to know, who is guarding the guardians?

Lyons and Mastanduno conclude that we are likely to experience an ongoing "chipping away" at the sovereign autonomy of nations. However, they end with the following cautionary note:

The idea of state sovereignty is alive and well among both the more powerful and less powerful members of contemporary international society. Even if states increasingly share authority with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the state system endures.

So where does that leave us? For the isolationists and the unilateralists, the question of international intervention is, of course, not important for they believe that the United States should not, or need not, rely on other nations or the international community in advancing our security interests. However, as I have said in the first two of these dialogues, I do not believe the people of our country are prepared now, or in the foreseeable future, to pay the substantial—albeit quite different—costs arising out of either the isolationists' or the unilateralists' agendas.

For everyone else, including balance of power realists, Wilsonian idealists and everyone in between, they have to face the dilemma of balancing the reality of the continuing dominance of the nation state as the key player in international security affairs with the increasing transnational communications, economic forces, and values which are circumscribing national sovereignty.

In my opinion, we have no choice but to try to improve the international machinery for legitimating and, in some circumstances conducting, interventions in extreme cases where a nation's actions within its own borders necessitate such a response. To do otherwise would be to ignore the trends noted by Lyons and Mastanduno in 1995 and which have certainly considered apace since then. And whatever its shortcomings, and they are many, it is clear that the international machinery of choice, for the United States as well as for most of the world, and recognized in solemn commitments—for example including NATO's own charter—is the United Nations and more particularly its Security Council.

But it is equally clear that the UN's machinery is not now capable of fulfilling this role assigned to it by the international community. The sad current events in Sierra Leone, and previously in Bosnia, in Rwanda, in Angola, and in Somalia demonstrate convincingly that the UN cannot enforce the will of the international community unless all local parties accept its intervention. In other words, it can enforce an existing peace but cannot make peace.

And in the absence of an effective United Nations, I say to the advocates

of humanitarian intervention, we have to proceed with great caution. Furthermore, while various Western leaders and theorists have proposed standards to determine when and how national sovereignty should be overridden, such standards are neither comprehensive, nor clear, nor widely accepted.

Though I do not oppose the notion of international intervention in principle—because as I said before various global trends are moving us in that direction—in my opinion much will have to be done before we can or should stake important national interests on it. Among the steps which must be undertaken are:

Reforming the peacekeeping operations and decision-making processes within the UN and the Security Council.

Strengthening the capabilities of regional organizations, like the Organization for African Unity, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—and as I suggested earlier the European Union—to deal with regional threats to international order.

Thoroughly debating—including in this body—the proposed frameworks for intervention put forward by the Clinton Administration, the British government, and others.

None of these steps will be easy. For example, reforming the decision-making processes of the Security Council in a way that improves its ability to act would presumably involve curtailing the veto power of the permanent members. However, while such a change would eliminate or reduce the ability of China or Russia to block what we view as appropriate interventions, it would also similarly constrain our own capacity to prevent what we view as undesirable actions by the UN. Strengthening the capabilities of regional entities raises resource questions, and, as already discussed, developing a serious European defense capability raises a number of additional concerns. And developing any sort of meaningful consensus about the principles for international interventions even among NATO members—let alone among both developed and developing countries—will be an extremely long and difficult process. But for anyone who can conceive of circumstances where an international response will be in our national interest, it is the type of effort we will have to undertake.

Mr. President, that concludes my remarks in this, our third session on the US Global Role. Our next discussion will hopefully take place during the week of May 22, and in many ways is at the heart of the concerns which motivated both me and Senator ROBERTS to initiate these dialogs: the central question of when and how to employ American military forces abroad. I look forward to that debate—which will appropriately occur just before the Memorial

Day break—and I hope other Senators will participate.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Is there any time left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has expired.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to commend Senator CLELAND and Senator ROBERTS for instituting this bipartisan dialogue relating to the global role of the United States. We normally only discuss these issues when a real-world contingency is looming and we do so under significant time constraints and within the dynamic of rapidly unfolding crises. This dialogue, which allows us to discuss these issues in a better setting, will hopefully contribute in a better understanding of the various perspectives on these issues and may bring us closer to a consensus on the fundamental issue of the global role of the United States.

This week's subject—"Multilateral Organizations"—is a very broad area. I will confine my remarks to those multilateral organizations that have responsibilities relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. I have in mind organizations like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the mutual defense treaties to which the United States is a party.

I would like to briefly discuss several recent international crises and the role that the various multilateral organizations played in addressing those crises. I want to note, at the outset, that sometimes they were successful and sometimes they failed.

Mr. President, I don't know how many of my colleagues have ever been to Dubrovnik. It is an ancient and breathtakingly beautiful seaside city on Croatia's Dalmatian coast. When the Yugoslav Army subjected Dubrovnik to indiscriminate shelling in October 1991, resulting in the systematic destruction in the old city and the loss of many civilian lives, the European Union or the Western European Union should have used force to end this barbarity in their own backyard. If they had, the ensuing damage and loss of life throughout the Balkans might have been avoided. Instead of acting with force, however, the European Union declined to take any forceful action. For its part, the UN Security Council imposed an international embargo on the supply of arms to the combatants, thus succeeding in locking in the advantage that the Yugoslav